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 Recent research by E.O. Wilson, James Q. Wilson, Simon, Alford-Hibbing, 
Carmen and others indicates that the competing social science paradigms of 
behavioralism and rational choice are in their last throes.  Their salient weakness is 
insensitivity, bordering on ignorance, to politics as a biologically-orchestrated 
phenomenon.  More specifically, political scientists know precious little about either 
genetics or evolutionary dynamics. 
 In this paper, I present a new theory--sociogenomics--to replace the shopworn 
conceptions of yesterday’s political science.  I then demonstrate how social scientists can 
employ the tools of molecular biology to flesh out the genes coding for baseline political 
attitudes and behaviors.  The theory and methods of sociogenomics will serve to 
synthesize the social sciences with the natural sciences in a broader consilient framework, 




 Political science is a discipline in need of a paradigm.  What else is new? 
 Fifty years ago, our predecessors could not even agree on what to call their 
academic domiciles:  did we live in departments of government, of politics, or of political 
science?  Were we institutionalists or behavioralists?  Did we believe in natural laws or 
natural rights?  If we were in the business of theory construction, could “theory” also 
mean normative theory? 
 Today, the waters are as murky as ever.  The empiricism of behavioralism -- 
steeped in the premises and biases of social psychology and attitudinal inference -- has 
long since come under challenge from the deductivism of rational choice -- steeped in the 
premises and biases of the economic marketplace and Rawlsian philosophy.  Those who 
hold dear to the preachments of the Enlightenment must fend off the rapacious 
deconstructionists who argue not only against scripture but against science. 
 This paper will not engage those who do not believe in science; it will not even 
engage those who do not believe in political science.  As E.O. Wilson (1999:  269) has 
implied:  in each and every bona fide competition between the theory and practice of 
science and the theory and practice of some other calling, science has won out.  This 
paper will engage the central question at issue for political science in our time:  how can 
we construct an overarching paradigm for the grand purpose of at long last ending the 
internecine squabbles among those of us who believe in the scientific pursuit of things 
political? 
 The principle “squabble” continues to be between behavioralists and rational 
choicers (Alford and Hibbing, 2004:  1, hereinafter A-H), with each side elegantly 
dissecting the weaknesses of the opposition.  Behavioralists emphasize their commitment 
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to investigating the attitudes and actions of real people jousting for influence and power; 
rational actor models, they claim, are effective only in illuminating the politics of 
“unreal” people wallowing in acultural preferences.  Social choice advocates counter with 
proofs that humans are fully capable of knowing what’s good for them politically and 
acting accordingly; they scoff at the behavioralists’ reliance upon socialization and group 
identification as result-oriented conditioning agencies.  Moreover, both sides find 
themselves under fire from New Institutionalists who contend that politics cannot be 
ripped from the contexts of formal and informal decision-making trappings. 
 The core thesis of this paper is simply that these competing paradigms fail 
because they are not scientific enough.  Put succinctly, they eschew a study of the human 
political species as a species, which means they have nothing whatever to say about the 
driving force of all other species’ attitudinal and behavioral repertoires:  genetics.  The 
year 2005 has seen the dawn of a new subfield, a new focus for political science:  
“genetics and politics.”  In that year, Alford and Hibbing published two salient reports 
developing the genetics/politics nexus, while Carmen published a monograph staking out 
the broader lineaments of the new subfield.  It would be a gross oversimplification, 
however, to believe that the emerging emphasis on human DNA in these writings sprang 
from nowhere or, as Greek mythology would have it, from Zeus’s brow.  A decent 
respect for history requires a brief acknowledgement of intellectual debts proudly 
incurred.  The survey to follow emphasizes the writings of various political science 
disciplinary leaders and is designed to show their natural affinity with a “genetics and 
politics” perspective had they only had the benefit of today’s molecular biology. 
 
 4
I.  The Genetic “Presence” in Political Science 
 
 Our profession should exult in knowing that Aristotle -- loosely speaking, a 
disciplinary founding father extraordinaire -- was in a very real sense the discoverer of 
the DNA principle.  He observed, in the highest spirit of empirical insight, that chickens 
came from eggs and that oak trees came from acorns; there was some plan or process that 
inevitably caused A to become B (Ridley, 2000: 12-13).  And so was born the first law of 
genetics:  the biological sciences, at root, are the study of information and its 
transmission.  Are we to believe, haughtily, that the social sciences are immune or 
impervious to that law? 
 Certainly the founders of the American Political Science Association did not think 
so.  One hundred years ago, John Burgess argued that politics was indeed a science and 
that students of politics should study political phenomena in the same fashion as a 
biologist studied life forms.  His colleagues, Bryce and Lowell, talked of “political 
organisms” and “the Physiology of Politics” (emphases added).   In short, integral to a 
scholarly investigation of Homo sapiens -- our species’ patterns of thought and action -- 
was an investigation of Homo politicus (Somit and Tanenhaus, 1967:  19, 24, 33, 71-72, 
75).  To be sure, their followers declined to be their disciples; they concentrated their 
attention on congressional power structures and voting behavior inter alia, oblivious to 
the natural sciences.  This did not discourage deeper disciplinary thinkers from pondering 
what could be.  To quote Charles Merriam:  “Is it not possible that the real relationship of 
students of politics is with biology or neurology rather than with psychology?” (1925, 3rd 
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ed.  1970:  171).  Today, we could (and should) include along with psychology our 
current reliance on economics. 
 The problem was that political scientists and biological scientists back then had 
precious little to talk about.  Darwin had long since startled the Western World with his 
grand theory of evolution, synthesizing the twin principles of natural selection and 
reproductive success, and eventually biologists would fold into their thinking the tenets 
of Mendelian genetics.  But the Darwinian argument presented even these scholars with a 
raft of unanswered questions such as “survival of the fittest what?” and “if organisms are 
forever competing, why would they ever cooperate even within a species?”  In the 1960s, 
evolutionists made significant progress.  They developed a new terminology:  “inclusive 
fitness,” “coefficients of relatedness,” “reciprocal altruism.”  What it all meant was that 
fitness was measured by genetic parameters, that genetics could explain the commonest 
forms of cooperation, and that altruism among nonrelateds was largely a function of 
contractual expectation forged in the crucible of mutual reproductive (read:  genetic) 
success (Hamilton, 1964, Trivers, 1971). 
 From this literature came a new paradigm and a new guru.  The paradigm was 
called sociobiology; the guru was E.O. Wilson.  Essentially, sociobiologists contended 
that those social behaviors possessing the greatest survival capacity were precisely the 
behaviors best suited to carry forward the participating organism’s relevant genetic 
characteristics.  So human culture became, in their hands, the dependent variable of a 
population’s DNA.  “(T)he ...social sciences ... are the last branches of biology waiting to 
be included in the [Darwinian conception],” Wilson wrote (1975: 4).  Ultimately, 
sociobiology in unvarnished form fell short of its aim.  It smacked too much of genetic 
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determinism.  And yet the study of human behavior received a well-justified jolt:  No 
longer would the Freuds, Skinners, Meads, and Marxes corner the market in providing 
architecture for the human psyche. 
 Appreciating the weaknesses in his initial effort, Wilson, assisted by Charles J. 
Lumsden, a physicist, embarked on a major revision.  They called their contribution the 
“gene-culture coevolutionary cycle.”  It works as follows:  genes provide a context for 
neurological structure and function; the mind perceives and discriminates among cultural 
phenomena, expanding in power accordingly; human behavior will, in the long run, adapt 
to those cultural conditions that favor species survival; genotypic probabilities, therefore, 
are subject to evolution in the light of these conditions just as the conditions themselves 
are selected for by the relevant cranial processes.  So genes affect minds that affect 
cultures that affect genes (Lumsden and Wilson, 1981).  “The challenge is to link the 
genes and their products into functional pathways, circuits, and networks”  (Loomis and 
Sternberg, 1995:  649).  Taken together, these lines of analysis have given birth to a new 
field of study:  evolutionary psychology.  With the exception of the hardy breed of 
political scientists who founded and nurtured the Association for Politics and the Life 
Sciences 40 years ago (for examples of their work, see Schubert, 1981, Masters, 1989), 
sociobiology and Wilsonian thinking had barely made a dent among our troops.  Now, 
with the merger of Darwinian principle and the cognitive sciences, a few noteworthy 
members of the political science discipline began to enter the conversational lists. 
 A good place to start is the work of Herbert Simon.  For Simon, the subject matter 
of cognitive psychology, which investigates what “[happens] inside the head” of political 
actors, is the light and the way of today’s scholarly mission.  Cognitive psychology, for 
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him, goes hand in hand with his own formulation, bounded rationality.  People are 
decidedly limited in their abstract reasoning capacities, and they search very heuristically, 
incompletely, and sometimes inadequately through partial sets of information, their 
algorithms of choice often veiled in ignorance and yielding, therefore, hopefully 
satisfactory, rarely optimal solutions.  Displaying a deeper appreciation of public law 
concepts than many public law specialists, Simon likens “bounded rationality” to 
procedural due process of law, where the “choosing organism ... uses methods of choice 
that are as effective as its decision-making and problem solving means permit ....  [This 
is] behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the external situation 
and by the capacities of the decision maker” (emphases added in first two instances).  
With procedural due process and bounded rationality, the process of decision is rational if 
reasonable.  Social scientists must “flesh out by a myriad of facts ... our aspirations for ... 
[general laws, using as a model] the complexities of molecular biology (emphasis added) 
(Simon, 1985:  294, 301). 
 Simon was no student of behavioral genetics or even physiological psychology.  
But he helped set the stage for today’s discussions.  Consider his observation that species 
fitness is much enhanced by social learning or “docility,” the ability to “accept well the 
instruction society provides.”  Because human rationality is bounded, docility carries big 
payoffs; people simply cannot optimize their capacity to select what they need to learn.  
Over time, docility becomes favored by natural selection, as it is at least reasonable to 
learn what society seems to think we should learn.  If the social arbiters teach altruism, 
then altruism ought to spread eventually throughout the population, thus enhancing the 
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survival and genetic success of the altruists.  Docility, then, is bestowed by the genes 
(Simon, 1990). 
 Very much in the spirit of Simon’s work in this area are James Q. Wilson’s 
contributions.  Wilson says humans possess a “moral sense” arising from an “attachment 
response” or an “affiliate trait” that has been “selected for” by evolutionary processes.  
These sentiments “constitute the fundamental glue of society,” and the “founding 
sentiment” is the “parent-child relationship” (Wilson, 1993: 1, 7).  Wilson supported this 
assertion by citing evidence from anthropology and social psychology.  Children are 
every bit as indulged by the precivilized on the Kalahari as they are by the suburbanites 
in the megalopolis; infanticide is practiced only under extreme environmental stresses 
that could occur anywhere; youngsters develop by assuming eventually the mantle of 
responsibility for the well-being of their aging forebears, though they gain little in 
tangible reward for so doing; the brain of the newborn is not a blank sheet of paper, for 
children prefer human sounds to other sounds, prefer their mothers’ sounds above all 
other human sounds, and express a broad array of nonverbal facial displays before 
anyone can teach them anything.  Wilson summed up these data as follows:  “bonding is 
driven by powerful biological forces” (Ibid.:  4). 
 Wilson is a full-blooded Aristotelian.  So when Aristotle talked of a “natural 
striving to leave behind another that is like oneself,” remarked that a “parent would seem 
to have a natural friendship for a child, and a child for a parent,” and found that “in the 
household” one sees exhibited the rudiments of “political organization,” which by nature 
tends toward (that is, evolves over time into) the city state, Wilson pinpointed 
justification for each link in this chain of reasoning in “modern science.”  If the 
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fundamentals of political order are subsumed in nature, then perhaps the fundamentals of 
political rights are also subsumed in nature.  For Wilson, the evidence is overriding.  
Social psychologists have shown that “fair play” -- that is, procedural due process -- “is a 
necessary condition for the child to satisfy its natural sociability.”  Children also reject 
“equality in results” when their peers don’t deserve what they receive (Ibid.: 5, 8-9).  In 
the light of all this, he has some justification for chiding evolutionary biologists because 
they “ordinarily do not specify the psychological mechanism by which a trait that has 
been selected for governs behavior in particular cases” (Ibid.:  7).  If only they all -- 
including Wilson himself -- had what I shall presently call the new paradigm of 
sociogenomics staring them in the face. 
 Simon and the Wilsons were vitally concerned with the workings of the human 
mind, yet they fail to provide us with a serviceable model.  “Men think in terms of 
models” (Deutsch, 1951:  230), so we need to ask:  Which model of species decision 
theory best comports with the Darwinian perspective? 
 The models most favored in the social science literature are drawn from the 
theory of games, and the most often employed of these models is Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD).  Political scientists are partial to PD because it yields an uncommonly parsimonious 
solution to a central inquiry in our discipline:  Should humans cooperate or should they 
defect?  The leading figure studying the biobehavioral implications of PD is Robert 
Axelrod. 
 In an attempt to provide a solution to PD, Axelrod joined forces with W.D. 
Hamilton, one of the most brilliant geneticists of the past half century.  They began by 
drawing a correspondence between “single-play” PD among non-kin and “single-play” 
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interactions of unrelated organisms in nature:  defection is always the preferred strategy 
for maximizing survival and fecundity.  Even when the number of interactions is multiple 
but known, defection rules the day.  But when the game is an iterated PD and the number 
of plays is both unknown and multiple, other strategies become competitive.  A computer 
tournament pitting these various algorithms against one another produced a surprise 
winner:  TIT FOR TAT.  The lesson is:  it pays to cooperate provided defectors are 
punished immediately but never excessively.  Empirical research shows TIT FOR TAT is 
an evolutionarily stable strategy among vampire bats and vervet monkeys, while 
experimental simulations demonstrate its robustness for tree swallows and stickleback 
fish (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, Axelrod and Dion, 1988). 
 Axelrod (1987) has also tested the fitness value of TIT FOR TAT by using the 
genetic algorithm format.  He converted various PD strategies into chromosomal form 
featuring a 2-bit DNA code:  C for cooperate, D for defect.  After one all-play-all round, 
the most robust chromosomes were permitted to mate with one another; the less robust 
were dropped.  Critical to the play of this game is that two well-documented processes of 
genetic adaptation, crossover and mutation, are here employed to order the DNA 
sequences of chromosomal progeny.  Eventually, the high-scoring routines come to 
resemble in large degree TIT FOR TAT.  What we have here is another proof predicated 
on genetic theory and methods to show the evolutionary potential of cooperation-
reciprocity choice making as the most viable political strategy. 
 Perhaps the skeptic will argue:  computer simulations are not the real world.  
Research on “green beards” provides a good test case.  A “green beard” (the term was 
coined by geneticist Hamilton) is a simple gene for altruism that is species adaptive in 
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candidates where organisms display green beards, recognize one another, and respond 
preferentially.  How, biologists wondered, could “green beards” possibly trigger complex 
social behaviors?  Well, green beards do exist, and the proof of principle is found in the 
slime mold.  When in need of food, two cells, each bearing the csA allele, will adhere to 
one another at their joint gp80 protein sites and coalesce into a larger mass consisting of 
reproductive spores and nonreproductive stalk cells.  The stalk cells will then sacrifice 
themselves to enhance the reproductive cells’ food-gathering opportunities.  In laboratory 
tests, molds in which this gene was knocked out emerge as “cheaters” when “playing the 
game”; they would have the capacity to latch onto the proliferating mass while giving 
nothing in return, so green bearded alleles repulse them (Crespi and Springer, 2003).  
Enter Axelrod and colleagues.  Their computer simulations demonstrate that cooperation 
through donation (classic altruism) will show itself a fit strategy over time as measured 
by rates of offspring proliferation in game theoretic contexts where green beards take the 
form of “tags” or display markings of some sort.  Note:  in each case, the “players” had 
never before “seen” one another (Riolo et al., 2001).  Note also:  our “table setting” peers 
are moving ever closer to the domain of “genetics and politics.” 
 When would political scientists ever move into the biological sciences laboratory 
and conduct experiments in search of phenomena central to our discipline?  That step was 
taken 20 years ago by Douglas Madsen.  He linked whole blood serotonin to power 
seeking in humans.  His research did not purport to show causation but did purport to 
show -- and, indeed, did show -- association, if one accepts how he defined power 
seekers.  In that study, power seekers were self-defined dominance seekers, whose 
responses to written questionnaires demonstrated they were of the type A personality 
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configuration (Madsen, 1985).  In subsequent work, Madsen provided two improvements.  
First, he substituted for questionnaire responses an actual competitive environment, and, 
second, he compared reactions to that environment among clusters of high WBS subjects, 
average WBS subjects, and low WBS subjects.  Again, a strong association between 
power seeking as defined and WBS prominence emerged (Madsen, 1986).  At this point, 
Madsen might well have pondered:  “If only I could test for the genetic precursors for 
serotonin accrual in competitive situations.  I would then be well on the road to 
operationalizing E.O. Wilson’s coevolutionary cycle in the context of a salient political 
formulation.”  The answer to his musing would have been a brick wall.  Not only did we 
lack knowledge of “genetic precursors,” we seemingly had no way to find them if they 
indeed existed.  And that is essentially why even those few political scientists who 
studied matters biological have written so little about DNA pure and simple.  Today, it’s 
a whole new ballgame. 
 
II.   Twin Studies 
 
 
 Social psychologists have been gathering voluminous data on identical and 
fraternal twins for at least 30 years both in the US and abroad.  These findings have been 
seized upon only recently by political scientists, and they constitute the first building 
block for sociogenomics investigation.  Identical twins are virtually congruent genetically 
as respects their nuclear DNA, while fraternals are no more genetically related than any 
other two brothers or sisters sharing the same biological parents.  Twin study specialists 
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have published detailed reports documenting the heritability quotients arising from 
comparisons between the two cohorts.  By “heritability quotient” (HQ) is meant the 
variation between them which can be ascribed to genetic differences.  Of especial 
concern to us are heritabilities in the context of behavioral propensity. “Behavioral” is 
defined broadly to include personality and ideology.  The conventional wisdom is that 
when comparing identicals (monozygotes) and fraternals (dizygotes), the heritability 
score for an array of behavioral traits is about .50 (Robins, 2005).  This means that, on 
average, the variation between cluster members is .50, i.e., 50% of these behavioral 
differences can be attributed to genetics (for the computational method, see Wilson, 
1999:  151).  The other 50% is largely a function of unshared experiences.  (For a study 
implicitly challenging the high HQs recited here, see Hughes, 2005).  Even political 
scientists who eschew an overt “genetics and politics” commitment have spotted the 
implications of these data for their own scholarship.  Take the public law research 
agenda.  In his early work on jurimetrics, Schubert relied on “attitudes” as the key 
independent variable, and by attitudes he meant what the authors of The American Voter 
meant -- social psychological affinities (Schubert, 1965).  Today’s attitudinalists sound a 
somewhat different note. 
Although genetic explanations of behavior may not be ‘politically 
correct’ ... the evidence from the ... studies of identical twins 
reared apart is compelling:  About half of the variance in 
personality traits, including several that tie closely to political 
attitudes, can be attributed to genetic diversity (Segal and Spaeth, 
1993:  234). 
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 The most oft-cited twin study data are drawn from repositories in Minnesota and 
Virginia.  Table I reports the major findings of relevance to political science.  By a 
“politically relevant” repertoire or variable as these terms are employed in Tables I-V is 
meant a behavioral propensity which social scientists have associated through their 
conventional scholarship with some political dynamic.  The extent to which particular 
genes singly or collectively play a causal role in determining the expression of such 
propensities is the overriding long-term question before us.   
 Alford, Funk, and Hibbing were provided access to Eaves’s Virginia data set, and 
included here are the salient heritabilities they have published (2005, hereinafter A-F-H).  
All are statistically significant at the .01 level.  Note their substance:  they essentially 
track respondents’ support for issue positions, and virtually all significant policy items on 
the contemporary agenda are represented.  The highest quotient (.51) is for the death 
penalty (cited in A-H), and the lowest (.27) is for segregation.  Taken at face value and 
given our discipline’s bias in favor of environmental/cultural determinants, these results 
should send shock waves through our ranks.  But we need to dig deeper.  For the Virginia 
sample, “socialism” elicits a .36 HQ, yet it could do no better than a .14 in an Australian 
study.  Does the term mean such different things in these two universes?  More 
importantly, the aggregate score for “conservatism” is approximately .38; however, the 
term “liberalism” achieves an underwhelming .18.  We would certainly expect the 
concepts of “conservatism” and “liberalism” to trigger about the same level of 
acceptance, if we have defined them in the same way so that each is the obverse of the 
other.  As I shall show in a moment, this was not the case here.   
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 Needless to say, there is no “death penalty gene.”  Responses to Table I policy 
positions or culturally loaded words and phrases (e.g., “Moral Majority”), to the extent 
they implicate heritability, must link to some larger attitudinal/behavioral 
configuration(s) which is/are genetically influenced.  There is an on-going, noteworthy 
debate as to the parameters of this larger phenomenon.  Some commentators argue for a 
strong relationship between political ideology and psychological profiles (Tetlock, 1983, 
1984, Jost et al., 2003); others disagree (Greenberg and Jonas, 2003, Alford and Hibbing, 
2006).  Table I presents several of these personal characteristics and their HQs.  Most of 
the data come from the Minnesota studies and were cited in Carmen (2004).  Others are 
included for the first time in the political science literature with this writing.  They range 
from baseline happiness (.80) to anxiety (.32).  Both of these have been tied directly to 
US presidential behavior (Barber, 1972); so also has novelty-seeking (.40) (Hamer and 
Copeland, 1998).  Political scientists who study cooperation/defection would certainly 
want to know that the HQ for altruism is .50, and those who investigate rationality ought 
to benefit from the knowledge that the HQ for general intelligence is .52.  Table I also 
reports robust heritability scores for radicalism and right-wing authoritarianism.  Taken 
together, the statistically significant HQs for issue positions and theoretically relevant 
psychological indices would seem to establish a prima facie case of linkage.   
 The presumption, at this stage of the dialogue, is rebuttable.  The heritability 
quotient for the Big Five (neuroticism, extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, 
and openness) may be .50; however, taken as a whole, the set is unrelated to political 
ideology (Alford and Hibbing, 2006).  And so, the argument runs, “the political realm 
may have unique biological substrates (and perhaps genetic markers)”; in any event, 
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much work needs to be done to flesh out the heritabilities not only of personal 
temperament but also of social temperament (responses triggered by “small-scale social 
situations”) and political temperament (“preferences for the structure and conduct of 
group life”) (Ibid., 6).  It is the latter constellation of values which returns us to 
consideration of the conservative-liberal dimension. 
 The conservative-liberal dimension is the most commonly probed ideological 
affinity in our literature.  Untutored in that literature, twin study specialists not only show 
little interest in developing standardized tests to flesh out its dynamics but sometimes 
provide precious little guidance for respondents.  Both the Virginia and Australia 
research studies included the following instruction:  “Here is a list of various topics.  
Please indicate whether or not you agree with each topic by circling Yes or No as 
appropriate.  If you are uncertain, please circle ?” (italics in text).  And yet Table I shows 
fairly consistent and high heritability quotients for conservatism:  .43, .32, .62, .31, .55, 
.45.  What we need are two uniform questionnaire rosters, one administered to 
conservatives and the other to liberals.  These clusters would be identified via pretests.  
The items should deemphasize policy preferences; they should be predicated on 
perceptions and dispositions for and against political change and inequality which theory 
informs us (Jost et al., 2003) are the critical underlying variables.  The Survey Research 
Center (Ann Arbor) has developed inquiries of this kind, though none have been 
employed of late and require fine-tuning.  Rossiter (1962:  16-17, 74, 168) argues that 
conservative legions are divided between “traditionalists,” who are constitutionalists, and 
“pure traditionalists,” who are “enemies of change as well as reform [and who] live in a 
state of acute cultural schizophrenia.”  Liberals, presumably, display a corresponding 
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dichotomy.  In fact, many observers years ago noted that a substantial number of ex-
communists sat on the editorial board of the National Review.  Can there be genetic 
antecedents linking hard-core conservatism and hard-core liberalism, wherein the 
particular ideological predisposition is the .40-.65 cultural contribution?  Applying 
properly constructed sets of questionnaire items to identicals and fraternals would 
separate out various types of conservatives and liberals and then penetrate to the 
heritability dimension.  That study is now underway. 
 
 
III.  Genetic Procedures, Genetic Precursors 
 
 
 Presumably skeptics are now prepared to give the notion of “genetics and 
politics” half a chance:  twin study data may have pock marks but their central message is 
too clear simply to ignore.  The fallback position for those remaining unconvinced is not 
difficult to imagine:  Show us the genes.  Scientists have been here before.  Twenty years 
ago, when entomologists and lower-order mammalian experimentalists began the quest 
for behavioral genetic antecendents, “doubting Thomases” expressed the same 
reservations.  They have been proven wrong. 
 Table II displays a sampling of genes in these nonhuman species which, if 
isolated in Homo sapiens, would provide important information as to our political 
behavior repertoires.  Researchers have determined the structure and function of each 
gene.  Table II captures this information.  It specifies the particular piece of DNA, the 
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precise form that the DNA assumes in the species of interest, the protein artifact arising 
from this allelic configuration, the behavioral routine spawned by the action of the 
protein, and the appropriate published sources.  Out of 30-odd instances of success in 
tracking down these genes, Table II shows only the most recent -- and, in many ways, the 
most impressive -- of these accomplishments.  Our colleagues are learning more each 
year about how to shed light on the sociality of life forms, and our knowledge of insect, 
mouse, and primate politics has grown enormously.  It is common knowledge among 
molecular biologists that the fundamental genes responsible for human action are 
conserved up and down the phylogenetic tree.  Each and every gene cited in Table II -- 
genes influencing stress vulnerability in rats, foraging in honey bees, social feeding in 
nematodes, aggressiveness in Old World monkeys, and faithfulness in male prairie voles 
-- has its counterpart in the human.  All are either orthologs or homologs of DNA found 
on every double helix of every cell in our bodies.  The exact workings of these genes in 
our species is a front-and-center concern of our biological science peers. 
 Table III provides insight into some of the methodological tools available for 
analyzing genes.  The idea is either to insert a gene of interest into the DNA of some 
other species and assess its impact in behavioral contexts or delete a gene of interest from 
a species’ DNA to assess how that organism will manage in behavioral contexts without 
it.  Again, precision is the order of the day:  experimentalists must be able to chart which 
allele (version) is to be manipulated (genes come in different versions as with blue/brown 
eyes), what protein will be triggered by that allele, and, of course, the hypothesized, and 
later proved, behavioral repertoire resulting therefrom.  Again, the genes employed have 
human counterparts, and the action patterns resulting from their expression have clear 
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political implications if the terms “power” and “influence” mean anything in the context 
of life form scrutiny.  To illustrate:  geneticists bred a “fierce” strain of mice and then 
inserted into its embryos a human gene matching the missing sociality rodent gene.  
Viola!  The super-aggressive mice returned to normal.  Putting human DNA into lower-
order creatures will be commonplace in years to come. 
 Those who believe that investigating behavioral genes in lower-order organisms is 
one thing but that investigating them in the human constitutes some qualitative, 
unbridgeable leap are in for a rude awakening.  While research reports are widely 
scattered and, incredibly, have never been appropriately organized, collated, and 
contrasted, Table IV attempts to convey to a political science audience the basics of what 
needs to be said.  Proceeding in chronological order of discovery, one notes 15 gene-
related sequences with clear political implications.  Some of these fall in a twilight zone 
area between disease genes and personality genes.  How does one classify clinical 
depression, bipolarism, and attention-deficit disorder?  There are thousands of Americans 
and many thousands of non-Americans who exercise free speech, who vote, who 
contribute money to political causes, and who “play political games” each and every day 
who could slide conveniently into one of these behavioral categories.  People who are 
clinically depressed handle stress far less satisfactorily than others, and there ought to be 
a high correlation between stress overload and various strains of political orientation and 
participation (Carmen, 2004).  It used to be that scholars bandied about such wastebasket 
terms as “psychopathic personality” and “manic depression.”  Genetics has rendered 
those terms obsolete and will render at least some of the terminology we employ today as 
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obsolete.  The more refined the distinction, the better the opportunity to link one of these 
configurations to some political mind-set or action-set. 
 As one glances down the Table IV list, it is easy to spot the importance of the 
neurotransmitters serotonin and dopamine in influencing sociality.  Consider the 5-HTT 
promoter on chromosome 17.  The gene in question controls the serotonin transporter 
function.  Initially, scientists were unable to associate that gene with a whole battery of 
behavioral characteristics.  What they eventually did discover was that a critical 
difference lay not in the gene coding sequences but in the promoter regions located 
“upstream” on the double helix.  This system can display a “long” version and a “short” 
version.  The long or normal system (a mere 32% of the general population) effectively 
clears serotonin deposits; the short mutational system (68%), which is dominant, permits 
serotonin accrual (the percentages provided in Carmen, 2004:  178 are incorrect).  (Note:  
most deleterious alleles are recessive as with, say, the cystic fibrosis mutation; others, 
such as the Huntington’s chorea killer, are dominant.)  What is the genetic disparity?  The 
normal version contains 16 sequence repeats approximately 20 base pairs per repeat (a 
base pair is either A-C or T-G), while the shorter version contains 14 of these repeats, a 
difference, then, of 44 nucleotide sequences.  There is a high correlation between the 
“short” version regime and neuroticism, and further tests showed that three particular 
manifestations of neuroticism -- anxiety, angry hostility, and impulsiveness -- are 
significantly related to the short version.  Yet another high correlation was reported for 
harm avoidance, especially worry, pessimism, fear of uncertainty, and fatigability.  Table 
I notes that neuroticism has an HQ of .50, and geneticists have concluded that the short 
version allele (whether in homozygous or heterozygous form) accounts for as much as 
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50% of that differential.  Should political scientists synthesize twin study data on 
neuroticism and its sub-traits with 5-HTT promoter configurations of subject leaders-
followers or winners-losers, the discipline would be taking a bold step forward in 
defining political behavior. 
 Now consider dopamine.  Hamer has investigated the dynamics of what he calls 
the “novelty” or thrill-seeking syndrome.  High scorers on questionnaire items enjoy the 
play of new ideas; they are predisposed to openness in thought and often action.  Low 
scorers are cautious and conventional, prudent and orderly.  Table I tells us that novelty-
seeking is .40 heritable.  Hamer did not inquire -- we need to inquire -- if high scorers 
correlate with liberalism and if low scorers correlate with conservatism when we square 
off monozygotes against dizygotes.  The misnamed “novelty gene,” actually the D4DR 
gene, is located on chromosome 11.  This gene makes a dopamine receptor protein.  
Rather like serotonin, dopamine is one of those brain chemicals that needs to be at 
equilibrium in the typical case, or personality problems and worse arise.  Dopamine 
overload correlates with highly risky behavior:  too much gambling, too much sex, too 
much drinking.  What about too much politics?  How would one define “too much 
politics”?  The D4DR gene contains a series of 48 letter repeats.  The average number of 
repeats runs from 4 to 7; those with 2 or 3 are extraordinarily effective in clearing 
dopamine, whereas those with 8 or more (the ceiling is 11) are not very effective at all.   
If a subject has two “longs” (one from the father, one from the mother) or a “long” and a 
“short,” the correlation with novelty-seeking is far greater than for a subject exhibiting 
two “shorts.”  That is, people with less acute pleasure centers have a genetic impetus to 
develop compensating behavioral propensities.  Hamer concludes modestly that the 
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D4DR gene accounts for only 4% of the .40 HQ (Hamer and Copeland, 1998, Ridley, 
2000).  Of course, it would be wrong to assume that “pure types” are forever gene-driven, 
that they can do nothing to counterbalance their firmly established mindsets.  We take 
action contrary to our genetic pulls and pushes all the time.  Still, these efforts are 
corollary to the fundamental role of genetics in politics. 
 Table IV highlights further instances of dopamine circulation as politically 
relevant antecedent.  Note that in these cases either the critical gene or its allelic 
configuration varies.  For example, the D4DR precursor displays a strong association 
with obsessive compulsiveness.  Here, the critical genetic structure is not a question of 
“long” vs. “short” occurrence; it is the absence of allele 2 in the 48-letter polymorphism 
located in exon 3 of this gene (coding regions are called exons; DNA sequences that do 
not code for proteins are called introns).  In another instance, the DAT1 gene on 
chromosome 5, the only dopamine transporter, enhances in children -- adults have yet to 
be tested -- what is called “generalized anxiety.”  The key parameter is the frequency of a 
40-base pair repeat, viz., where the governing allele features 10 as opposed to 9 copies.  
And where subjects are homozygous for the 10-repeat allele in DAT1, attention-deficit 
disorders emerge; again, the line is not bright between personality and hygienic 
properties.  Finally, the COMT gene on chromosome 22 (see Table IV) metabolizes 
released dopamine.  It exhibits a diallelic polymorphism:  met and val.  Executive 
cognition, as demonstrated through Wisconsin Card Sorting Test facility, is enhanced 
significantly in subjects displaying two mets; the contrary occurs in subjects displaying 
two vals.  In other words, increased dopamine circulation detracts from mental acuity.  
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As the genes coding for intellectual gifts are deciphered, the keys to political perspicacity 
should become ever clearer. 
 Perhaps the oddest, and certainly one of the most controversial, DNA sequences 
itemized in Table IV is Hamer’s inaptly dubbed “God gene.”  Questionnaire returns have 
indicated that some people display a greater sense of “self-transcendence” than others, 
what Hamer calls a sense of spirituality.  Spirituality, he says, “provides a numerical 
measure of people’s capacity to reach out beyond themselves.”  Australian twin-study 
findings had pegged self-transcendence as .48 heritable.  Could spirituality be, in 
considerable component, a genetic artifact?  Hamer attempted to correlate self-
transcendence with the D4DR.  Result:  negative.  He then tried to correlate self-
transcendence with serotonin DNA precursors.  Result:  negative.  But Hamer hit the 
jackpot when he sought association between self-transcendence and the VMAT2 gene on 
chromosome 10.  This is a less specialized gene than the others responsible for 
neurotransmitter function.  Its protein packages all of the many monoamines into 
secretory vector units, bundles the brain uses to store signalling molecules.  A certain 
polymorphism can present two alleles, one in which a key letter is an A and a second in 
which that letter is a C.  If subjects carry a C on either of the two inherited 10s, then they 
will score much higher on a spirituality index than those carrying two As.  The C 
configuration apparently occurs in about 28% of our species.  Query:  Is this a gene 
highly indicative as well of altruism?  To what extent do spirituality and cooperation 
overlap?  Are there ethnic differences in these DNA carriages? 
 Several paragraphs ago, there was discussion regarding the need to link “genes 
and their products into functional pathways, circuits, and networks.”  A proliferating 
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literature in political science stresses the need to address decision making as a 
neuroscientific phenomenon (McDermott, 2004).  Table IV addresses part of the 
challenge -- but only part -- by pinpointing protein reactions and behavioral repertoires.  
Table V presents data on the missing connection:  the neurophysiological rules and 
processes that capture the brain’s several structures as action systems during the play of 
political contests.  Virtually all these data were recruited by employing the functional 
magnetic resonance imaging technology as subjects participated in a wide variety of these 
contests.  Table V takes note of the format or game being played, the identities of the 
competitors, the object or result of the contest, and the winners and losers broadly 
defined.   
 Of optimal value would be experiments conjoining genetic and cranial 
parameters.  Only two Table V investigations qualify, unfortunately.  One should keep in 
mind that this is a very new field; all Table V studies are post-2000.  Table IV reported a 
strong correlation between those carrying the “short” version of the 5-HTT promoter and 
anxiety.  This finding received a powerful boost when researchers demonstrated a 
statistically significant correlation between subjects carrying at least one copy of the 
“short” serotonin transporter promoter mechanism and elevated activity in their right 
amygdalas following exposure to anxiety-producing pictures.  Control groups made up of 
“long-long” individuals recorded significantly lower levels of response.  Acting 
instinctively in reaction to messages received from the thalamus, the amygdala sets up the 
first line of defense against perceived dangers.  The linkages with the serotonin carriage 
system shows that when subjects are particularly fearful, often for genetic reasons, the 
right amygdala overreacts.  Table IV also reported a high correlation between participants 
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bearing the met version of the COMT gene, dopamine catabolism, and high executive 
cognition.  When MRI tests were then utilized to measure prefrontal cortical efficiency in 
met vs. val working memory task performers, the met allele individuals scored much 
higher. 
 The amygdala is a complex socially relevant information processing center, 
citations to which are just now beginning to appear in the political science literature.  
When the typical American white sees a picture of the typical American black, the 
subject’s amygdala fires off an emotional response, a loose translation of which might be:  
here is someone different.  We carry around the genomic baggage of prehistory when 
facial recognition developed as a key monitoring device for sorting in-groupers and out-
groupers.  Environmental conditions can alter the equation.  If the typical American white 
sees a picture of Tiger Woods or Michael Jordan, then chances are that that individual’s 
amygdala won’t respond:  the subject will have unconsciously coded them as insiders 
(Carmen, 2004: 189-190).  Table V displays useful findings.  We now know through 
functional MRI amygdalar screenings that inhibited infants grow up generally to be 
“avoidance” adults, while uninhibited infants grow up generally to be novelty-seeking 
adults (the Schwartz study).  These tests have also detected differential roles played by 
the left amygdala and the right amygdala in reacting to “anger faces” and “fear faces.”  
The left amygdala shows a high degree of sensitivity as to whether the stimulus gaze is 
frontal or averted whereas the right amygdala is unresponsive to such nuances (the 
Adams study).  And when individuals were well apprised of cooperators, having 
identified them through the play of Prisoner’s Dilemma, subsequent facial assessments 
triggered the left amygdala reacting in concert with such other reward centers as the 
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striatum (the Singer, 2004, study) (cf. the quite different cranial responses to cooperators 
during the actual playing of the PD game, at least among women) (the Rilling study).  
Finally, the amygdala along with the orbitofrontal cortex becomes much more active 
when players are challenged to accept ambiguous as against risky options, that is, 
individuals much prefer the latter to the former even when the expected payoffs are equal 
(the Hsu study).  To say that we need to appreciate the genetic mainsprings of amygdalar 
function is a gross understatement, though we have learned recently that the stathmin 
gene is highly expressed in the lateral nucleus of the mouse amygdala, and when this 
gene is knocked out, subjects do not respond either to learned or innate fear (Shumyatsky 
et al., 2005). 
 Applications to more overtly political choice making are inevitable.  U.C.L.A. 
researchers essayed a tentative first step when they used the MRI technology to measure 
partisan reactions to facial images of Mr. Bush and Mr. Kerry.  They found an intriguing 
dance between the emotional centers and the cognitive centers, as both Republicans and 
Democrats fought to convince themselves of their candidates’ manifest superiority.  That 
these cranial processes can be captured by the tools of biological science -- therefore 
adding a further layer of richness to our understanding of a key political event -- is most 
informative.  From these solid empirical findings, the investigators proceeded to spoil the 
party by jumping to the conclusion that the Red State/Blue State divide is a fictional 
artifact of our own self-deception.  Equally unwarranted is the assertion that the divide is 
in fact an expression of genetically-driven “gut” affinities (A-F-H, 2005).  We have a 
long way to go before we can demonstrate neurophysiological causation for any cultural 
cleavage among nation state electoral camps. 
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IV.  From Genetics to Genomics 
 
 
 Thus far, our tale has been a commentary on what might be called 
“sociogenetics.”  The theory, methods, and data reflect the good science of 20 years ago 
brought up to the present moment by recent discoveries.  The orientation is wedded to the 
structure and function of specific genes acting alone to orchestrate social behaviors in 
sundry species.  Even today, sociogenetics comprises, along with the policy implications 
arising therefrom, the paradigmatic stuff of a viable “genetics and politics” subfield for 
our discipline.  And yet, as we speak, the term sociogenetics is yielding to the term 
“sociogenomics.”  What is its genesis and what does it mean? 
 The human genome, that is, all of our species’ nuclear DNA, is made up of 
approximately 3 billion nucleotide sequences (base pairs).  The “pairs” are a 4-bit code 
with A always binding to T and C always binding to G.  If we knew every A, C, T, and 
G, then the search for the 25,000 genes buried throughout these sequences, which 
themselves make up the various chromosomes we carry, would be simplified 
exponentially.  This major coup was largely achieved in the 1990s. 
 Access to the human genome, taken as a whole, provides parsimonious entrée to 
the investigation of complex traits of which human social behavior -- human political 
behavior -- is a prime example.  Complex traits arise from a battery of genes acting 
together.  According to Gene Robinson, a leading entomologist who coined the term and 
nurtured its growth into full-fledged paradigmatic status among biologists, 
“sociogenomics” refers to the social behavior of life forms as an outgrowth of global 
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determinants (that is, genomic patterns) employing a comparative species perspective.  
Sociogenomicists avail themselves of DNA data culled from the fruitfly, the yeast, the 
mouse, and the rat, among many other species, all of whose genomes have now been 
sequenced (Robinson, 2002).  This cross-species approach adds a key evolutionary 
component to sociogenomics.  Genes are no longer treated as static entities, frozen in 
time.  Genes evolve as they negotiate the interspecies journey, and they evolve in humans 
as our species, forever seeking to maximize reproductive and survival opportunities, cope 
with exogenous stimuli.  Lumsden and Wilson had argued that culture itself placed 
certain genes under selective pressure, thus spawning new alleles.  There is evidence that 
the D4DR dopamine receptor has come under selective pressure, enhancing Homo’s 
wanderlust (Olson, 2002).  There isn’t much genetics, much less genomics, in Lumsden-
Wilson.  Sociogenomics provides a corollary article to their canon of truths. 
 Until very recently, before the dawn of sociogenomics, behavioral traits could be 
traced down (not without difficulty) by utilizing four categories of inquiry:  linkage 
analysis, allele-sharing technologies, association studies in humans, and model organism 
comparisons (Lander and Schork, 1994).  An in-depth treatment of each is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  In candor, political scientists cannot hope to perform sociogenetic -- 
not even to mention sociogenomic -- experiments without forming collaborations with 
scholars well versed in molecular biology.  They still have a responsibility to appreciate 
the underlying logics and larger theoretical dimensions of the several procedures 
mentioned here.  Suppose one wanted, ten years ago, to investigate the genetic 
antecedents of the conservatism-liberalism attitudinal complex.  It would first have been 
necessary to establish objectively the phenotypic characteristics to be tested for and then 
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develop family tree blueprints which would serve as transmission models.  After a 
putative gene such as those cited in Table IV had been mapped, the next step would 
evidently have been to show that allelic concordance occurred more often than expected 
by chance.  One would also construct experimental and control groups in order to 
compare unrelated affecteds with unrelated unaffecteds.  The question would be whether 
specific alleles crop up in those displaying a certain personality characteristic at a 
significantly higher frequency.  Finally, as we have seen, some genes can be slipped into 
or out of animal models to pin down precise behavioral manifestations.  Now that 
researchers can clone mice, sheep, cats, and pigs, we have at our disposal today uniform 
physiological environments for assessing the role of human DNA in a wide variety of 
animal contexts. 
 All of this should sound sufficiently daunting to explain why an empirically 
grounded subfield entitled “genetics and politics” has been considered pie in the sky.  
Capturing the human genome changes everything.  At the lowest level of magnitude, the 
conventional linkage and association procedures mentioned above have generated 
impressive new insights.  With the former, researchers, who have at their disposal genetic 
markers highly correlated with certain behavioral tendencies, scan the genome in search 
of precursor DNA chromosomal locations.  The short arm of chromosome 6, the short 
arm of chromosome 8, and the long arms of chromosomes 13 and 22 seem to be prime 
locations for mutations implicated in various disorders.  With the latter, comparing the 
presence of candidate genes in those displaying sundry antisocial patterns against those 
immune from these stresses in the context of genomic investigation has yielded virtually 
all of the probative data found in Table IV (Bouchard and McGue, 2003: 36). 
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 At a higher level of magnitude, new theory also inspires new methods, and, in this 
case, the breakthrough procedure of choice is called the microarray gene expression 
technology.  In an array experiment, genetic material from two sources of interest, for 
example species A and species B or perhaps a human experimental and a human control 
group, are laid on a glass substrate, and scientists measure the levels of expression 
occurring simultaneously.  Subject clusters provide DNA samples, and putative genes of 
interest contained in these samples trigger expression responses from their counterparts in 
the microarray universe.  Researchers can place billions of DNA sections on the chip, 
each one about 25 bases in length.  In a notable study, honey bee specialists tested 5500 
genes employing 72 microarray runs to demonstrate that age-related shifts by adults from 
hive tasks to foraging tasks could be linked to expression change in 39% of the sample; 
this finding eventually led to nearly perfect predictions of species behavior based on 
genetic expression profiles (Whitfield et al., 2003).  Figure 1 provides an oft-cited display 
of the microarray system in action.  After “competitive hybridication,” in which single-
stranded complimentary DNA from the two discrete samples interdigitate, a greater 
number of Gene X copies in sample A will lead to one color-coding (say, red) and a 
greater number of Gene X copies in sample B will inspire a different color-coding (say, 
green).  Put more precisely, the expressed genes are detected by the presence of 
messenger RNA, which is converted back to complimentary DNA (genes without introns 
or “junk”).  Figure 2 is an artist’s reproduction of one of the 16 array boxes, created to 
highlight exactly what the scientist sees. 
 Microarrays have led to startling new genetic discoveries, examples of which can 
be found in Table II.  To repeat, all these genes have human counterparts; assessing their 
 31
functions, however, requires the use of animal models.  If we could apply the microarray 
procedure to humans as we do to honey bees, we could test directly for personality and 
ideological antecedents in the straightforward manner described above.  As we cannot 
kill human subjects and rescue the messenger RNA expressed in their brains following, 
say, the play of some game, we must be content now with the rich harvest of behavioral 
genetic precursors emerging from the laboratories of entomology and related disciplines. 
 Microarrays become a truly robust vehicle for sociogenomics investigation when 
the experimental data take the form of human single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).  
All of us share 99.9% of our DNA sequence.  Polymorphisms are stretches of DNA we 
do not share, thus ensuring that we are not all clones.  Genes that exhibit different alleles 
in different people hold the secret to phenotypic variation.  That is, they hold the secret to 
political attitude and behavior heritabilities.  Each one of these is called a SNP.  By 
convention, more than 1% of the population must share the solitary letter substitution.  
The human genome, it is now estimated, contains 9 million SNPs; 400,000 of them reside 
in exons; SNPs responsible for amino acid composition shifts could number 200,000.  
Also to be accounted for are promoter region SNPs, which, as we have seen, can have a 
marked influence in gene expression levels.  To repeat:  Each SNP variation yields a 
unique allele.  The Holy Grail in the now well-underway SNP race is the identification of 
all functional SNPs.  This paper takes the position that the Holy Grail of Human 
Sociogenomics is the totality of functional SNPs coding for behavioral propensities.  One 
of the keys to SNP discovery is the microarray procedure.  That is to say, microarrays 
ferret out disparate gene expression levels in nonhuman subjects, the genes implicated in 
the sundry behavioral repertoires then provide clues to the identities of SNPs in human 
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subjects, following which individual variations are correlated with behavioral/attitudinal 
differences.  Eventually, political scientists working with biological scientists can 
commence to control for the role of each gene one by one, folding in as well interspecies 
and pedigree data.  The sociogenetic tasks referred to earlier as daunting will become 
manageable, though exceedingly challenging, sociogenomic tasks.   
 An alternative vision (Alford and Hibbing, 2006:  15) suggests a procedure in 
which individuals provide saliva specimens for genetic information after which statistical 
evaluation of correlations between candidate alleles and behavioral responses can be 
undertaken.  The procedure certainly would permit us to compare SNP composition with 
phenotypic reaction; a drawback is that gene expression cannot be demonstrated in saliva 
(or blood for that matter) unless salivary genes were involved, because messenger RNA 
implicated in the tests of interest to political science would be tissue specific to the brain.  
It is hard to believe that the DNA relevant to ideology encodes proteins known to be 
present in saliva.  And note, it is proteins, not genes, that would show up in saliva 
following, say, the play of game theoretic exercises.  Even for microbiologists, getting 
from proteins to DNA is exceedingly difficult. 
 Working with molecularists to ascertain politically-relevant messenger RNA in 
the brain and working with molecularists to track politically-relevant proteins backwards 




V.  The Longer View 
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 In 1998, E.O. Wilson endeavored to sketch a coming world view of scholarly, of 
intellectual inquiry.  The term he used to describe the inevitable fusion of all human 
knowledge is “consilience.”  He envisioned social science achieving a heightened 
maturity as its practitioners labored cheek to jowl with natural scientists.  Already, his 
ideas have mobilized enlightened souls working in the trenches of other fields to rethink 
their paradigmatic premises.  So we see economists, psychologists, and neuroscientists 
converging into a single, unified discipline called neuroeconomics (Glimcher and 
Rustichini, 2004).  These scholars have not even bothered to consider political scientists 
as allies.  We are coded as either irrelevant or hopeless.  Perhaps they are right.  
However, they have already committed a fatal oversight.  Yet to be included in their 
paradigm is a sociogenomic component.  Those few of us toiling in “genetics and 
politics” terrain can, this early in the game, claim a leg up on them.  The question is 
whether our discipline as a whole can achieve a leg up on them.  Should we choose to do 
so, we will make for ourselves a unique contribution in the drive towards consilience.  
Aristotle, who saw the end of the tunnel but no ways to reach that end, would enjoy, one 
fervently hopes, a burgeoning consilience of scientific inquiry in which the various tasks 
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Table I: Selected Twin Study Reports of Political Variable Heritabilities (Above .25 and Statistically Significant) 
(Ranked by HQ Within Studies) 
 
 
Phenotypic Characteristic Heritability 
Quotient 
 
Primary Lit. Source Pol. Sci. Lit. Source 
Death Penalty .51 Martin et al. (1986)  
(Australia-Brit.) 
A-H (2004) 
Censorship .41 Ibid. Ibid. 
White Superiority .40 Ibid. Ibid. 
Disarmament .38 Ibid. Ibid. 
School Prayer .41 A-F-H  (2005) 
(Virginia) 
A-F-H (2005) 
Moral Majority .40 Ibid. Ibid. 
Capitalism .39 Ibid. Ibid. 
Pacifism .38 Ibid. Ibid. 
Republicans .36 Ibid. Ibid. 
Socialism .36 Ibid. Ibid. 
Women’s Liberation .33 Ibid. Ibid. 
Death Penalty .32 Ibid. Ibid. 
Censorship .30 Ibid. Ibid. 
Gay Rights .28 Ibid. Ibid. 
Segregation .27 Ibid. Ibid. 
Democrats .26 Ibid. Ibid. 
[Liberalism] .18 Ibid. Ibid. 
Conservatism 
(Pearson’s Correl. 
Coeffic. of the Above) 
.43 Ibid. Ibid. 
Conservatism 
(Mean of the Above) 
.32 Ibid. Ibid. 
Death Penalty .48 Martin (1986) 
(Australia) 
Ibid. 
Censorship .39 Ibid. Ibid. 
Disarmament .37 Ibid. Ibid. 
Abortion .26 Ibid. Ibid. 
[Socialism] .14 Ibid. Ibid. 
Table I (Cont.) Twin Study Data 
 
 
Phenotypic Characteristic Heritability 
Quotient 
 
Primary Lit. Source Pol. Sci. Lit. Source 
Conservatism 
(Mean of the Above) 
.31 A-F-H  (2005) Ibid. 
Baseline Happiness .80 Lykken & Tellegen 
(1996) 
Carmen (2004) 
Behavioral Inhibition to 
the Unfamiliar 
.41-.70 Smoller et al. (2003) This Paper (2006) 
Shyness-Boldness .55 Hamer & Copeland 
(1998) 
Carmen (2004) 
General Intelligence .52 Plomin et al. (1994) Ibid. 
Neuroticism .50 Plomin et al. (1994) Ibid. 
Male Homosexuality .50 Bailey (1995) 
(cited in Holden 
1995) 
Ibid. 





.48 Hamer (2005) This Paper (2006) 
Conservatism .45 Tellegen et al. 
(1988) 
Carmen (2004) 
Novelty-Seeking .40 Hamer & Copeland 
(1998) 
Ibid. 
Anxiety .32 Lemery & Doelger 
(2005) 
This Paper (2006) 
Table II: Lower-Order Genetic Precursors of Politically-Relevant Repertoires 
























FOR honey bees none expression 
elevation 
roving, foraging Ben-Shahar et al. 
(2002) 
Carmen (2004) 
NPR-1 nematodes presence of 
phenylalanine 
expression 
triggered by envir. 
stress 
social feeding Sokolowski 
(2002) 
Ibid. 
MAOA promoter apes; Old World 
monkeys 
shorter versions 












male prairie voles long version (19 











Table III:  Examples of Lower-Order Genetic Engineering of Politically-Relevant Repertoires 
 










Pol. Sci. Lit. 
Source 








anxiety in novel 
situations 
Stenzel-Poore et 
al.  (1994) 
This Paper 
(2006) 
V1a receptor gene 
promoter 
male voles transfer of prairie 




on brain structure 
love-making Young et al. 
(1999) 
Carmen (2004) 
NR2E1 “fierce” mice 
embryos 
human gene on 





















Pol. Sci. Lit. 
Source 















Players Object or Result Winners Losers Primary Lit. 
Source 








































unfair offerers vs. 
buyers 
bilateral anterior 
insula reaction vs. 
dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex 






Sanfey et al. 
(2003) 
Carmen (2004) 
anger and fear 





















Adams et al. 
(2003) 
Ibid. 





Players Object or Result Winners Losers Primary Lit. 
Source 
Pol. Sci. Lit. 
Source 
amygdalar 
response to novel 
vs. familiar faces 
(MRI) 



























striatum and other 
reward centers 












(revenge centers).  
same as Rilling:  
anticipation of a 
preferred social 
outcome 





Dems. and Reps. VPC:  affinity 
(limbic) 
DPC:  alienation 
(reason) 
ACC:  conflict 
(mediation) 
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Hsu et al. (2005) Ibid. 
cheaters and 
noncheaters 








NA NA Singer et al. 
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Ibid. 
 
